Since January 1 st the European Union has launched an EU-internal emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) for emission-intensive installations as the central pillar to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS may be linked at some time to a Kyoto emissions market where greenhouse gas emission allowances of signatory Kyoto countries can be traded. In this paper we investigate the implications of Russian market power for environmental effectiveness and regional compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol taking into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the EU ETS. We find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs when it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.
Non-Technical Summary
Under the Kyoto Protocol Russia has been granted much more emission rights than it is presumed to need for its business-as-usual economic development. The substantial amount of excess emission rights -often referred to as hot air -will enable Russia to behave strategically on the international carbon emissions trading market by rationing permit supply. Based on numerical simulations with a simple multi-sector, multi-region (partial equilibrium) model of carbon abatement and emissions trading, we investigate the implications of Russian market power for environmental effectiveness and regional compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol taking into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the recently created EU-internal emissions market. We find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs when it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.
Introduction
On February 16 th 2005 the Kyoto Protocol entered into force upon prior ratification by Russia. Despite the withdrawal of the United States -the world's major emitter of anthropogenic greenhouse gases -the Kyoto Protocol is often praised as a milestone in international climate policy because (i) it is the first regime to impose binding greenhouse gas emission limits on industrialized countries and (ii) it builds on flexible mechanisms to facilitate efficient implementation of emission abatement requirements. In January 2005, i.e. shortly before the coming-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union started off an EU-internal emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) as the central pillar of European climate policy to comply with the Kyoto Protocol.
Against this background, we investigate the strategic climate policy options for Russia emerging from its role as dominant permit supplier on international emission markets:
Russia has been granted much more emission rights under the Kyoto Protocol than it is expected to need for its business-as-usual economic development. Note, that this point has been made before in the literature (see the next section for a review). The innovative contribution of the present paper consists of the consideration of the EU ETS under Russian market power within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. The potential market differentiation between the EU ETS and the Kyoto international emissions market may have considerable implications for Russia. How should the country ration its excess emission rights -often referred to as hot air -in order to maximize national revenues when taking into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the EU ETS? What are the implications of Russia's strategic policy options for regional compliance costs and environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol?
Based on numerical analysis with a model of carbon abatement possibilities by regions and sectors we find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs when it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by describing the current institutional framework of international climate policy and laying out different strategic climate policy options for Russia; it furthermore summarizes the main insights of the relevant previous literature. Section 3 presents the analytical framework which is used for numerical simulations of selected climate policy scenarios based on empirical and projected data. Section 4 motivates the policy scenarios under investigation. Section 5 discusses simulation results. Section 6 concludes.
International Climate Policy: What is at Stake?
Within the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change the industrialized countries (so-called Annex B countries) committed themselves to reduce their emissions for the period 2008 to 2012 by specific amounts relative to 1990. Based on experts' projections of future emission trajectories, these commitments imply effective cutbacks from business-as-usual (BaU) for most signatory Kyoto parties. However, some countries -most notably Russia -are expected to have BaU emissions that fall substantially short of the national emission budgets as granted under the Kyoto Protocol.
These excess emission rights -commonly referred to as hot air -have generated some discussion in the literature (see, e.g., Bernard et al. (2003) , Böhringer (2000) , Klepper and Peterson (2005) , Michaelowa and Koch (1999) , Paltsev (2000) ). The main insight of this literature is that the supply of hot air will lower the international permit price significantly. However, the results depend on the assumptions regarding the strategic behavior on the supply side as well as on the strength of terms of trade effects. According to the data used in the present study (EU (2003) and DOE (2005) ), the Russian hot air amounts to 615 MtCO 2 .
The Kyoto Protocol allows for flexible instruments which may be used by signatory parties to reduce their compliance costs: International Emissions Trading (IET) between industrialized countries as well as project-based Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) with hosts either in industrialized (JI) countries or developing countries (CDM). Among these instruments, IET may be used to generate income from sales of hot air. Independent from the meanwhile legally binding status of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has pushed forward an EU-internal emissions trading system for energy-intensive sectors -the so-called EU ETS -as a key market-based instrument to implement its Burden Sharing Agreement (EU (1999) ). The latter defines national emission reduction targets across EU Member States in consistency with the aggregate EU commitment under the Kyoto Protocol. Energy-intensive sectors (installations) which are covered by the EU ETS (in the following DIR sectors) are able to trade permits among each other. However, the current EU ETS implies a hybrid regulation scheme as other sectors (in the following NDIR), such as households or transport, are not covered and therefore require complementary regulation in each EU Member State to comply with the national targets as prescribed by the Burden Sharing Agreement. The carbon emission sources in the EU are therefore subject to different regulatory regimes that are not directly linked to each other via flexible instruments. This segmentation of the EU carbon market induces efficiency losses from restricted "where-flexibility": Although marginal abatement costs across DIR sectors within the EU will be equalized, they might differ substantially from the marginal abatement costs in the NDIR sectors of each EU Member State. In fact, the excess costs can be substantial if the NDIR sectors would be regulated by purely domestic policies only (see, e.g., Böhringer et al. (2005) , Klepper and Peterson (2004) ). Note, however, that EU governments may use international emissions trading at the governmental level to equalize at least marginal abatement costs across all NDIR sectors.
In assessing the institutional climate policy background, it should be noted that there are two important differences between the emissions market under the EU ETS and the IET established under the Kyoto Protocol. Firstly, under the Kyoto IET countries themselves are trading emissions while the EU ETS is strictly firm (installation) based. Secondly, the Kyoto Protocol covers the aggregated emissions of a country while the EU ETS is restricted to the energy-intensive DIR sectors and covers only roughly half of the total EU emissions. These differences between EU ETS and Kyoto IET are of critical importance for Russia's strategic options in international climate policy. Given larger amounts of hot air, Russia may act as a dominant player on the IET market, thereby rationing hot air supply to maximize its own profit. By focusing on Russia in this study we neglect possible strategic options for the remaining countries of the Former Soviet Union (i.e. without Russia and the Baltic States). However, taking into account that this region (in the following denoted as "XSU") comprises 11 heterogeneous countries with different policy interests the assumption of non-strategic behavior for the XSU region seems to be justified. 1 1 The XSU region disposes of 334 MtCO 2 hot air. According to the GTAP classification this region comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, In our subsequent analysis, we focus on three possible future climate policy regimes.
Firstly -as envisaged by the Kyoto Protocol -there is the option of IET for all signatory countries (including the EU). If emission markets were competitive, previous research on the Kyoto Protocol suggested that hot air will drive down environmental effectiveness and compliance costs eventually to zero (see e.g. Böhringer (2002) ). Monopolistic rationing of hot air on behalf of Russia may, however, ensure positive marginal abatement costs, and thus some effective emission reduction (see e.g. Böhringer and Löschel (2003) ). Secondly, there is the possibility that the EU will continue to implement its Kyoto target internally: The EU ETS applies to DIR sectors within the EU and Member States use an emissions trading similar to the Kyoto IET for their NDIR sectors within the EU only. At the same time all other signatory Kyoto parties join the IET market with Russia maximizing revenues through monopolistic supply of hot air. In this setting, it may be possible that EU Member States make use of the Kyoto IET on the global market for their NDIR sectors while the EU ETS for DIR sectors remains separated. Thirdly, one may imagine a regime where Russia leans towards -or possibly joins -the EU ETS (which is separated from the Kyoto market) and at the same time takes part in the Kyoto IET and maximizes hot air revenues there. In this case, Russia has an interest to avoid a fragmentation of its hot air supply to the EU ETS, as hot air permits issued to Russian DIR firms would dilute its market power. Thus, one might consider a situation where Russia manages a pooling of its EU ETS permit supply: 2 Price discrimination on both -the EU ETS market as well as the IET Kyoto market -might then be an attractive option for Russia to maximize revenues from hot air sales.
Analytical Framework
We investigate the implications of Russian market power under different assumptions of market linkages with a simple multi-sector, multi-region model of carbon abatement and emissions trading. 3 The partial equilibrium model is based on marginal abatement cost curves for the DIR and NDIR sectors across signatory countries of the Kyoto Protocol:
Marginal costs of abatement vary considerably across countries and sectors due to Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Given the UNFCCC data on CO 2 emissions (UNFCCC (2006)) Ukraine (47%), Kazakhstan (20%) and Uzbekistan (11%) hold the largest shares of CO 2 emissions among the members of the XSU region. 2 Article 28 of the EU ETS Directive (Directive 2003/87/EC) concedes this option. See Golub and Strukova (2004) for a similar reasoning. 3 For a detailed description of the model see http://brw.zew.de/simac. differences in carbon intensity, initial energy price levels, or the ease of carbon substitution possibilities.
In order to obtain country-specific marginal abatement cost curves for the DIR and NDIR sectors, we make use of the PACE model -a standard multi-region, multi-sector CGE model (for a detailed algebraic exposition see Böhringer (2002)) which is based on the most recent consistent accounts of national production and consumption and bilateral trade and energy flows for the year 2001 (as provided by the GTAP 6 database). 4 We perform a sequence of carbon tax scenarios for each region relevant to our analysis where we impose uniform carbon taxes (starting from 0 to 100 $US per ton of carbon). We thereby generate a large number of marginal abatement costs, i.e., carbon taxes, and the associated carbon emission reductions in DIR and NDIR sectors.
The discrete data can be fitted to continuous marginal abatement cost curves by an ordinary least-square approach. For the empirical specification of sectoral marginal abatement costs curves across regions i we adopt a polynomial of third degree:
is the marginal cost of reducing carbon emissions in country i, i e are the BaU emissions, and e i are the actual emissions, i.e. α of marginal abatement cost curves. As an illustration the marginal abatement costs for selected regions are depicted in Figure 1 . 5 The differences in the marginal costs corresponding to the country-specific reduction target in the Kyoto Protocol are substantial. Obviously, there exists a large potential for aggregate cost savings by equalizing marginal abatement cost via trading of emission permits. 4 See Dimaranan and McDougall (2006) for the GTAP 6 database. 5 Note that the marginal abatement costs in Figure 1 and Table 4 are defined in $US per ton of CO 2 while the coefficients in Table 6 refer to marginal costs in $US per ton of carbon. 
Policy Scenarios
In our quantitative simulations, we distinguish two important dimensions of the near-term international climate policy regime: (i) the linkage between the Kyoto IET and the EU ETS (respectively the NDIR sectors of the EU), and (ii) the ability of Russia to exert market power.
We specify six policy scenarios to illustrate what is at stake in international climate policy during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol:
NTr:
All Annex B countries achieve their reduction target domestically. This is equivalent to a situation in which Annex B countries apply domestic carbon taxes that are high enough to meet their individual Kyoto commitments.
Kyoto-C:
All Annex B countries are allowed to trade emission permits among each other. All regions behave as price takers, i.e., perfect competition in the international permit market is assumed.
Kyoto:
This scenario is the same as Kyoto-C but with market power by Russia on the supply side, i.e., Russia is able to ration its hot air and to choose the profit maximizing price for its permits.
EU-Closed:
This scenario considers an intra-EU implementation of Kyoto targets. DIR sectors take part in the EU ETS and the EU member states may only exchange permits for their NDIR sectors between each other, i.e. there is no linkage between the Kyoto IET and the EU ETS and the NDIR sectors.
As in scenario Kyoto Russia has market power in the IET.
EU-NDIR-Tr:
This scenario is the same as EU-Closed, but the EU member states are now able to cover permit demand for their NDIR sectors from the Kyoto market. That implies a link between both markets and therefore additional demand on the Kyoto market compared to EU-Closed.
EU-RUS:
This scenario is the same as EU-NDIR-Tr, but Russia is now able to take part as a dominant supplier with market power in the separated EU ETS, i.e. there is now a linkage between the EU ETS and the Kyoto IET via Russia. As before, Russia has market power in the Kyoto IET, i.e. the country acts as monopolist on two separated permit markets. Böhringer and Löschel (2003) ) and are reconsidered for the sake of comparison and benchmarking. 
Simulation Results
Our analysis focuses on the total compliance costs (see Table 2 ) and the emission reduction in per cent of BaU emissions (see Table 3 ). We begin the interpretation of results with the NTr case. Without permit trading, each Annex B country has to meet its reduction target exclusively by domestic action. The associated marginal abatement costs are listed in Table 4 and visualized for selected regions in Figure 1 . Compliance to the Kyoto Protocol without trade induces substantial adjustment cost, which amount to more than 11000 m $US. The highest costs are borne by Canada and Japan. There are two major determinants in our partial equilibrium framework for the countryspecific compliance cost. Firstly, the effective reduction requirement a country has to fulfill as compared to its reference emission level (here: BaU emissions in 2010). The column NTr in Table 3 Therefore, this scenario reproduces insights from earlier analysis in the literature (see, e.g., Böhringer (2002) , Klepper and Peterson (2005) ).
Under monopoly power in scenario Kyoto, Russia exerts market power by rationing hot air to maximize net revenues. Russia sells 246 MtCO 2 , i.e. 40% of its hot air (see Table   5 ). Although environmental effectiveness is no longer zero, total emission reduction amounts to only 3.1% of aggregate BaU emissions, i.e. the environmental effectiveness falls by more than 70% as compared to purely domestic Kyoto implementation. The CO 2 value per ton amounts to 2.1 $US (see Table 4 ). Compared to NTr, the scenario Kyoto is indeed has an incentive to join the EU ETS as the country is then able to realize market power in two separated permit markets. The use of hot air for the DIR sectors is also profitable from the European perspective, since the EU compliance costs are further reduced compared to a situation where the EU ETS is not linked to the Kyoto market.
However, from an environmental point of view the Russian participation on the EU ETS leads to a further deterioration because of the higher amount of hot air which flows into the EU (additional 65 MtCO 2 compared to EU-NDIR-Tr) and the corresponding lower permit price in the EU ETS which reduces total abatement in this market.
Conclusions
Our simulation shows that the market design of the future international permit trading regime has a strong influence on the economic and environmental effects of the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, we identify two elements of the market structure -the linkage of different permit markets and the strategic behavior of Russia -which seem important for an evaluation of any future regime. Given a competitive market, Russian hot air is sufficient to make the Kyoto constraint non-binding. However, because of its large amount of hot air Russia is the dominant supplier of permits in any future permit market and may exert market power, i.e. influence the permit price. Note, that this point has been made before in the literature. The innovative contribution of this paper consists of the consideration of the EU ETS under Russian market power within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol.
We find that Russia will have incentives to join the EU ETS if the latter is separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs if it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.
Finally, the allocation of permits between DIR and NDIR sectors within the EU critically influences Russia's potential gains from joining the EU trading scheme. The possible price discrimination by Russia due to the separation of the Kyoto market and the EU ETS may therefore have implications for the future design of national allocation plans in
Europe. This detail of the interaction between institutional framework and market structure in international climate policy remains a topic for future research.
Appendix: Algebraic Model Formulation
This section provides an algebraic summary of the partial equilibrium model for permit trade underlying the simulations above. We begin with the model formulation for a competitive system of permit trade without the occurrence of hot air. Second, we show how hot air can be accounted for. Third, we lay out the set-up for the case of monopolistic permit supply in one market and -finally -in two separated markets.
Competitive permit trading
Under competitive permit trading, all countries i are price takers. Each country minimizes its compliance costs to some exogenous target level k i . Compliance costs equal the sum of abatement costs and the costs of buying permits. In the case of permit sales, the second term becomes negative, which means that the country minimizes the cost of abatement minus the income from selling permits. Costs are minimized subject to the constraint that a country meets its exogenous reduction target, in other words: a country's initial endowment of permits plus the amount of permits bought ( 0 > are minimized, since all opportunities for exploiting cost differences in abatement across countries are taken.
A.2 Accounting for hot air
A country with hot air ( i h ) minimizes costs of abatement minus income from selling
The amount of hot air equals the difference between the emission target and the businessas-usual emissions:
The first order condition yields:
The existence of hot air does not change the costs-efficiency property of unrestricted competitive permit trading since marginal abatement costs are still equalized. However, hot air sold on the permit market does not imply any effective (real) emission reduction in the hot air countries. The occurrence of traded hot air, therefore, results in an increase of overall emission compared to a situation without international permit trading.
Monopolistic permit supply in one market
Monopolistic permit supply is characterized as a situation where one country (denoted "m") -in our case the hot air country Russia -has supply power in the permit market while all other countries, denoted as fringe "f", behave as price takers. The fringe countries, thus, minimize their compliance costs given the permit price set by the monopolist. They emit carbon until the marginal abatement costs equal the permit price of the market, i.e. 
Marginal abatement costs are accordingly not equalized between the fringe countries and the monopolists, resulting in overall efficiency losses due to market power.
Monopolistic permit supply in two markets
Monopolistic permit supply in scenario EU-RUS is characterized as a situation where one country (denoted "m") -in our case the hot air country Russia -has supply power in two separated permit markets. 8 All other countries, denoted as fringe "f1" in market 1 and "f2" in market 2 behave as price takers. The fringe countries minimize their compliance costs given the permit price set by the monopolist. They emit carbon until the marginal abatement costs equal the permit price of the corresponding market, i.e. . Hence, the market with the more inelastic demand -the market that is less price sensitive -is charged the higher price. 
